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Is There a Future for Employer- Sponsored Health Insurance?
Summary
Over the next five years, the effects of the ACA on employer-sponsored insurance will be modest. In the
longer run, there is greater potential for disruption, depending on how firms respond to the subsidies available
on the exchanges for low-wage workers. In all, only about 15% of the workforce likely will be affected. The
impacts of the ACA on firms will vary widely based on three main factors: 1) the size of the firm, 2) the
average compensation within the firm, and 3) the degree to which wages within the firm are homogenous or
heterogeneous. Keeping in mind that employees pay for all their health insurance, group insurance is not
intrinsically superior to private exchanges, and cost trumps choice for consumers, firms will choose the option
that maximizes benefits to their workers, takes advantage of the best available subsidies while avoiding tax
penalties, and results in the lowest administrative costs. Making all low-wage workers eligible for the same
subsidies, whether they acquire coverage on the exchanges or in group plans, would be reasonable and involve
less distortions.
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With approximately 150 million Americans obtaining insurance through 
their employer, traditional employer-provided health insurance remains the 
cornerstone of the American health insurance market for the non-elderly, 
non-poor population. 
The federal and state health insurance exchanges, while 
generating a great amount of attention and controversy, 
still only represent a small fraction of the marketplace.
But will it stay this way? Will the new rules and 
incentives embodied in the Affordable Care Act—
especially after the employer mandate is fully put into 
place—cause significant changes in the use of employer-
based group health insurance for this population? In the 
short run, my answer to this second question is no. But 
in the longer run, there is greater potential for erosion 
from employer-sponsored insurance, depending on how 
firms themselves respond to the subsidies available on 
the exchanges for low-wage workers.1
ASSUMPTIONS
As an economist, there are a few commonly-held 
assumptions that underlie my own thoughts on the 
future of employer-sponsored health insurance:
Assumption #1: Employees pay for all their health 
insurance. With few exceptions, it is the employees, 
not their employers, who will always bear the benefits 
SUMMARY
•	 Over	the	next	five	years,	 the	effects	of	 the	ACA	on	employer-
sponsored	insurance	will	be	modest.	In	the	longer	run,	there	is	
greater	potential	for	disruption,	depending	on	how	firms	respond	
to	the	subsidies	available	on	the	exchanges	for	low-wage	workers.	
In	all,	only	about	15%	of	the	workforce	likely	will	be	affected.
•	 The	impacts	of	the	ACA	on	firms	will	vary	widely	based	on	three	
main	factors:	1)	the	size	of	the	firm,	2)	the	average	compensation	
within	the	firm,	and	3)	the	degree	to	which	wages	within	the	firm	
are	homogenous	or	heterogeneous.
•	 Keeping	in	mind	that	employees	pay	for	all	their	health	insurance,	
group	insurance	is	not	intrinsically	superior	to	private	exchanges,	
and	cost	trumps	choice	for	consumers,	firms	will	choose	the	op-
tion	that	maximizes	benefits	to	their	workers,	takes	advantage	
of	the	best	available	subsidies	while	avoiding	tax	penalties,	and	
results	in	the	lowest	administrative	costs.
•	 Making	all	 low-wage	workers	eligible	 for	 the	same	subsidies,	
whether	 they	acquire	coverage	on	the	exchanges	or	 in	group	
plans,	would	be	reasonable	and	involve	less	distortions.
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and costs of health insurance, whether 
they shop on the exchanges or pay 
premiums from wages for group 
insurance. Insurance premiums paid 
by employers are part of compensa-
tion, and offset money wages. By the 
same token, employers cannot shift 
the burden of health insurance pre-
miums to workers, because if they do, 
they would have to compensate them 
more in money wages.
Assumption #2: Group insur-
ance is not intrinsically superior. The 
value of an insurance arrangement is 
derived from the ability of workers 
to choose insurance that is efficiently 
priced, reflective of the benefits 
received, and appropriate to their 
needs. If these are the chief criteria of 
evaluating the efficiency of a system of 
coverage, there is no inherent value in 
preserving group insurance if private 
exchanges can provide the same ser-
vices at lower costs.
Assumption #3: Cost trumps 
choice. Surveys show that health-care 
consumers favor having more insur-
ance plan options, but what those sur-
veys don’t address is how much more 
those people are willing to spend 
to have additional options avail-
able. Employees may accept a small 
increase in cost in order to move to 
the greater number of choices on the 
exchanges, but it’s safe to assume that 
people who aren’t sufficiently dissatis-
fied with their current plan would not 
accept significantly higher premiums 
than what they pay in group insurance 
in order to have more choices on the 
exchanges.
With these factors of cost and 
choice in mind, we conclude that 
the interests of the employers and 
employees should run parallel to each 
other: both should want employees to 
have access to those attractive, effi-
ciently managed and priced insurance 
plans that employees prefer at those 
prices. It then stands to reason that 
firms will choose the option that a) 
maximizes benefits to their work-
ers, b) takes advantage of the best 
available subsidies while avoiding tax 
penalties, and c) results in the low-
est administrative costs. Therefore, 
in order to predict the most likely 
response of employers to the ACA, 
we must determine whether and how 
the ACA changes what is in the best 
interests of their employees.
ANALYSIS
The impacts of the ACA on firms 
will vary widely based on three main 
factors: 1) the size of the firm, 2) the 
average compensation within the firm, 
and 3) the degree to which wages 
within the firm are homogenous (all 
workers earning roughly the same 
amount) or heterogeneous (a mix 
of high-, medium-, and low-wage 
workers). Though this distinction is 
not specified in law, for our purposes 
we will describe small firms as having 
fewer than 50 employees, and medium 
firms as employing between 50 and 
200.2
To begin to understand the effects 
of the ACA, we will start by examin-
ing the two extremes of this spectrum: 
small low-wage firms (i.e., worker 
incomes below 200% of the poverty 
line) providing insurance, and large 
high-wage firms (i.e., worker incomes 
above 500% of the poverty line) pro-
viding insurance.
Small Low-Wage Firms: These 
firms will likely be among the most 
heavily impacted by the ACA, and 
the American workers they employ 
are prime candidates for moving to 
exchanges. Small businesses were 
unlikely to be providing insurance 
before the ACA, but if they were, the 
only subsidy they would have received 
would have been a small tax exclusion 
worth approximately 15% of the pro-
vided benefits. Since these firms are 
typically homogenous with respect to 
wages, employers who did offer insur-
 1 This	brief	builds	on	key	points	made	by	Mark	Pauly	during	
an	October	9,	2014	conference	co-sponsored	by	the	Penn	
Wharton	Public	Policy	Initiative	and	Leonard	Davis	Institute	
of	Health	Economics	entitled,	“Health	Care	Reform	2015:	
What	the	Research	Tells	Us.”
 2  The	U.S.	Census	Bureau	Statistics	of	U.S.	Business	Annual	
Data	for	2011	indicates	that	the	96.2%	of	employer	firms	
with	 fewer	 than	50	employees	 in	2011	accounted	 for	
27.6%	of	all	non-self-employed	workers.
NOTES
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ance likely would only have offered a 
single plan, and their employees who 
bought insurance in the small group 
market often faced unappealing and 
volatile premiums. 
Post-ACA, I would expect to 
see a dramatically different land-
scape. Businesses with fewer than 25 
workers are now potentially eligible 
for Supplemental Health Options 
Policy (SHOP) benefits, although 
their implementation has been slow. 
Employees at 200% of the poverty 
line can receive Silver Plans with a 
generous 50% subsidy. Or they can 
buy plans through the exchanges 
with loadings (extra fees added to 
basic premiums to insure higher-risk 
individuals) of about 15%. Given that 
the net change in subsidy is about 
35% (from 50% to 15%) or about 
$1400 on a typical $4000 premium, 
the additional subsidies available in 
exchanges will incentivize employers 
who were offering insurance to stop 
paying their part of the premium and 
instead pay the money as wages to let 
their employees seek better options 
through the exchanges. Since there is 
little efficiency advantage at the small 
group level, these firms have little 
to lose in making the switch. How-
ever, because the number of workers 
in low-wage small firms previously 
obtaining employment-based coverage 
was small, the main effect will not be 
erosion of group insurance, but rather 
initiation of insurance purchase by the 
formerly uninsured.
Large High-Wage Firms: I 
expect these firms to exhibit the 
smallest degree of change from 
the ACA. Before the ACA, more 
than 95% of the employees at these 
firms already had self-insured group 
coverage with loadings of about 5%. 
Moreover, they often had three or four 
plan options from which employees 
could choose, with coverage far more 
generous than that of a Silver Plan, 
although offerings typically would 
decrease as the company size shrinks. 
If the marginal income tax rate is 
25%, the overall marginal federal tax 
including payroll taxes would be about 
30-40% (depending on the maximum 
Social Security tax). 
Although the regulations of the 
ACA may slightly increase premi-
ums because of required coverage of 
preventive care and dependents up to 
age 26, there is no reason to anticipate 
any drastic change in the employer-
sponsored insurance offered by these 
large, high-wage firms. Incentives for 
switching to the exchanges simply are 
not there.  Employees in this category 
would not be eligible for any sizeable 
premium subsidies, and any replace-
ment of employer premium payments 
with wages would be taxed at 30-40%. 
If the firm has a lower-than-average 
risk, exchange premiums actually 
could become higher. The employer 
mandate penalty for failing to offer 
insurance is irrelevant in this case 
because the firm is assumed to offer 
coverage, but it would still be there to 
remind employers not to do anything 
foolish. Because of the high offer-
ings already provided, group insur-
ance would be the preferred option of 
these firms even without the penalty. 
Because the subsidy is lower in the 
exchanges, there will be no switch-
ing to the exchanges. We may see 
small effects on the tiny fraction of 
uninsured working in large firms as 
they switch from being uninsured into 
having group coverage.
Firms between the Poles: The 
effects of the ACA on other types of 
firms would fall between these two 
polar extremes. The ACA’s mandate 
penalty is likely to have a modest 
deterrent effect on large, low-wage 
firms, which might consider dropping 
employer-sponsored coverage, if the 
subsidy available on the exchanges 
is larger than the tax subsidy their 
workers currently receive. By contrast, 
small, high-wage firms likely provided 
insurance coverage to their employ-
ees prior to the ACA; they would 
have little incentive to switch to the 
exchanges now. The exchanges might 
offer more insurance plan choices, 
but at the cost of a lost tax subsidy, 
typically in the range of 20 to 50%, 
depending on income. As there is little 
evidence to suggest that workers are 
interested in paying more for increased 
choice, I expect these small, high-wage 
firms will stay off the exchanges. 
Similarly, medium-sized firms are 
likely to continue offering employer-
sponsored health insurance and may 
actually offer new, expanded coverage 
because of the employer mandate—
that is, unless the average wage at 
such a firm is so low (below 200% of 
poverty) that the exchange subsidy 
exceeds the amount of the penalty 
($2000) plus the tax exclusion (at 
least $450). Medium-sized firms also 
tend to be heterogeneous in terms of 
wages, with some high-wage workers 
and some low-wage earners, and that 
heterogeneity will help keep these 
firms nailed to the employer-based 
setting. While low-wage workers at 
these firms might be better off switch-
ing to the exchanges, where they could 
benefit from larger subsidies, high-
wage workers would be worse off, as 
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they would lose their tax exclusion 
while being ineligible for any com-
pensatory exchange subsidy. As firms 
tend to respond more to the interests 
of their high-wage workers, who are 
more expensive to train and harder to 
replace, we should expect medium-
sized firms with greater wage hetero-
geneity to heed the interests of their 
high-wage workers by sticking with 
employer-sponsored insurance.
Table 1 illustrates the distribution 
of insurance status (e.g., uninsured 
vs. individuals with public insurance, 
private insurance, or a combination 
of public and private insurance; and 
whether they obtained the private 
insurance through their employer 
or individual market) for individu-
als between 138% and 400% of the 
Federal Poverty Level, who are eli-
gible for subsidies to purchase insur-
ance through the exchanges, as well 
the same breakdown for individu-
als between 138% and 350% of the 
Federal Poverty Level, for whom the 
value of the exchange subsidy roughly 
equals the value of the tax exemption 
for employer-sponsored insurance.
 CONCLUSIONS
Over the next five years, the effects 
of the ACA on employer-sponsored 
insurance will be modest. Any ero-
sion in group coverage is likely to be 
limited to low-wage workers currently 
offered insurance in smaller firms, 
who are prime pickings for moving 
to the exchanges. However, there are 
relatively few such workers. The only 
other vehicle would be conversion of 
full-time low-wage workers in larger 
firms to part-timers who are exempt 
from the employer mandate penalty, 
but there are serious limits on a firm’s 
ability to manage with part-time 
workers.  And any erosion will be 
offset to a considerable extent by the 
expansion of employment-based cov-
erage to previously uninsured workers 
in medium and large firms, which are 
much less likely to send workers to the 
exchanges. In all, I estimate that only 
15% of the workforce will be affected.
The long-term picture is murkier, 
and depends greatly on how creative 
workers and firms are in responding 
to the incentives of the ACA. Since 
low-wage workers are better off in 
the exchanges, where they are eligible 
for a relatively generous subsidy, one 
could imagine firms spinning off their 
low-wage workers into small, low-
wage firms that would send workers 
onto the exchanges. If such reconfigu-
rations occur, the erosion of employer-
based insurance would increase 
significantly. And if this means that 
large numbers of low-wage workers 
are spun out of less expensive and 
highly efficient employer-based group 
plans, then that would not be a good 
economic outcome. 
My personal recommendation 
as an economist would be to make 
all low-wage workers eligible for the 
same subsidies, whether they acquire 
coverage on the exchanges or in group 
plans. That type of scenario would be 
reasonable and involve less distor-
tions and would leave the future of 
employer-sponsored insurance looking 
much as it is today.
TABLE 1: ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF AMERICANS YOUNGER THAN 65 YEARS OF 
AGE, ACCORDING TO INSURANCE STATUS, INCOME, AND EMPLOYER 
SIZE, 2012.*
 
Insurance Status Income 138-400% of the Income 138-350% of the 
  Federal Poverty Level Federal Poverty Level 
All 98,739,165 84,483,590
Public insurance only 8,824,391    8,332,361 
 In firms with >=50 employees   1,888,627  1,737,043 
Private insurance only 68,900,566  56,929,424 
 Employer-sponsored insurance  62,386,415  51,215,185 
 In firms with >=50 employees 55,942,112  45,672,517 
Individual market  6,514,151   5,714,239 
 In firms with >=50 employees  3,236,450  2,918,676 
Private and public insurance 5,811,337  5,078,155 
 Employer-sponsored insurance 4,876,367  4,210,647 
 In firms with >=50 employees 3,787,388  3,286,568 
Individual market 934,971  867,508 
 In firms with >=50 employees 346,024   304,923 
Uninsured 15,202,871  14,143,650 
 In firms with >=50 employees  7,745,201   7,225,688 
* Data are from an analysis of the Current Population Survey, 2013 Annual Social and Economic Supplement.
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